“If only …” is the theme of much German debate on the first 24 hours of the invasion, rivalling in bitterness the French reaction to Waterloo, or the British view of Jutland. Undoubtedly, national pride plays a part, and therefore some discount must be made. And, of course, it is always easier to fight a battle correctly after it is over than during the actual events. However, in the case of Normandy, the German view is virtually cancelled out by an equal and corresponding view from the opposite side, covering a somewhat longer period. “I am convinced that the way was wide open for exploitation during the first few days,” said Stanley Green, “but the Germans were allowed to re-group and rush up reinforcements which, with our air supremacy, should have been impossible. Utter confusion existed all round, with seemingly no one knowing what was going on and no one prepared to advance further than their original objectives.” The debate is further complicated by the fact that the British and Canadian operations were basically a feint; what General Bradley called a “decoy mission.”
